�����Ƶ

The basic Russian attitude to how missile defense affects strategic stability is a classic one: defense capabilities of one actor undermine second-strike capabilities of the other one, thus undermining strategic stability by creating incentives for a first strike.8 This link is present in the preface of the New START Treaty and will likely remain a part of any future strategic arms control accord. However, future arrangements could also mix politically and legally binding agreements, with missile defenses being on the “softer” side of such an architecture, since the passage of legal restrictions on missile defense limits in the United States is improbable. At the same time, because the development of weapons does not stop, the link between missile defense and first-strike counterforce capabilities remains crucial. Among the most concerning trends is the “left-of-launch” concept; that is, the capability to “defeat” a possible missile threat before an actual launch by destroying enough of an adversary’s missiles while they are still in/on launchers, thus creating space for “traditional” missile defenses to absorb the adversary’s remaining missiles. This concept remains relevant with many American officials and experts and keeps reappearing in official documents and diagrams.9

The left-of-launch concept is perceived as a rebranded counterforce posture, with understandable negative connotations for military planners and decision-makers, although in academic and expert communities this perception is more nuanced. The Russian general staff translates left-of-launch as “prestart intercept” (dostartovyi perekhvat) and considers it an essential part of U.S. missile defense efforts.10 Russian officials and scholars have been vocal about their concerns with the left-of-launch concept and the development of related capabilities. Hypersonic weapons are perceived as one of the tools for left-of-launch scenarios, but also as an instrument to overcome an adversary’s missile defenses.11

Another important scenario is the so-called “cyber” left-of-launch, which has been reported in the media but criticized by scholars.12 However, even if the ability to prevent missile launches (or even missile development) through cyber means remains questionable, the challenge lies rather in the perceived capability, not the actual one. In this case, the state that perceives itself to be a possible target of such operations might find itself in a classic “use-it-or-lose-it” trap; that is, it might decide to use the capabilities at its disposal early rather than risk losing them before they can be used at all, which can lead to a shift toward a more aggressive, preemptive doctrine of force employment (including nuclear forces).13 The basis of the Russian concern with missile defense is not that it will be able to counter 100 percent of strategic nuclear weapons in a salvo, but that it is designed to minimize the effects of the strategic delivery systems still able to launch after the United States carries out a first counterforce strike—employing a combination of nonnuclear and nuclear weapons “capable of accomplishing strategic tasks,” with both becoming more and more precise and thus more lethal.14 A first counterforce strike would be aimed at nuclear weapons delivery platforms; nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) nodes and centers; all types of command posts; early warning and missile defense radars; ports and airports (including submarine and heavy bomber bases); and other critical infrastructure.15

The developments in strategic nonnuclear strike capabilities lead to several unnerving takeaways. First, they would allow the adversary to achieve at least some strategic aims in the “prenuclear” stage of conflict. Second, such capabilities would “free up” nuclear warheads and delivery systems, resulting in even greater inequality of strategic forces. Third, the potential for an increased but unclear number and type of “incoming” munitions, coupled with the unclear and increased capability of missile defenses, would complicate the threat environment for strategic nuclear delivery systems.

In essence, though, these concerns are not about today’s or even tomorrow’s capabilities, but about the absence of limits on missile defense development for the foreseeable future. Such a situation, in turn, leads to hedging of missile defense penetration capabilities and investment in so-called air-space defenses. While these developments are currently qualitative (although even as such they have already produced several exotic systems), a renewed focus on quantitative improvement is also possible.
 

Endnotes

• 8I. Ivanov, “,” Foreign Affairs 79 (5) (2000): 15.
• 9U.S. Missile Defense Agency, (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Missile Defense Agency, 2020).
• 10“” [Russian General Staff: The United States is developing “prelaunch intercept” missiles], RIA Novosti, April 24, 2019.
• 11A. G. Arbatov, ed., [Arms control in the new military-political and technological conditions] (Moscow: IMEMO, 2020); and Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”
• 12H. Lin and A. Zegart, eds., Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018).
• 13For more on the “use-it-or-lose-it” trap, see P. Lewis and B. Unal, “,” Chatham House, July 2, 2019.
• 14“,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, December 7, 2020.
• 15P. Zolotarev, “,” Rossiya i Amerika v 21 veke [Russia and America in the 21st century] (3) (2021).

Russia has been transparent about its possible reaction to the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defense, especially since the early 2010s. Statements by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, presentations by Russian Ministry of Defense officials (and even an international conference), and articles by Russian military scholars have all portrayed a wide array of countermeasures along three main vectors: enhanced missile defense penetration capabilities; strike capabilities aimed at the destruction of missile defense assets, as well as active and passive defenses for national strategic assets, including NC3; and strategic nuclear delivery systems.16

In March 2018, when an array of so-called novel Russian strategic delivery systems was publicly revealed by President Putin, Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu said, “What is being created today in Poland and Romania, in Alaska and is supposed to be created in South Korea and Japan, this ‘umbrella’ of missile defense turns out to be ‘full of holes.’”17 A similar claim was made by Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov (former deputy of the Ministry of Defense and since July 2022 the head of Roscosmos, the Russian space agency), who asserted that the Russian Avangard hypersonic weapon “devalues the United States’ efforts to create a missile defense (ABM) system.”18 Nevertheless, the Russian side cannot be expected to disregard future developments and the role of new technologies and concepts.

The capabilities of all U.S. missile defense assets are gradually increasing, and emerging and disruptive technologies are playing an increasingly impor­tant role. Probably the greatest variables are related to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) and its next-generation interceptor. When the new kill vehicle will be tested and how capable it will be is unclear, although the United States plans to deploy it by the end of the 2020s.19 However, the new kill vehicle is likely to follow the pattern of the recently canceled Redesigned Kill Vehicle and Multi-Object Kill Vehicle efforts, which focused on the capability to better discriminate against decoys and to counter several incoming threats simultaneously.20 If the kill vehicle redesign project is successful and if a long-debated second GMD silo field on the U.S. East Coast becomes a reality, this would present a significant challenge to the ability of Russian (and Chinese) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to reliably deliver nuclear retaliation. At the time of writing, however, none of these issues have been definitively resolved.

The counter-ICBM capability of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system demonstrated in 2020 would allow the United States to rapidly increase its defensive capabilities due to the relatively wide availability of Mark 41 launchers in the U.S. Navy and the possibility of placing new Aegis Ashore installations on the continental United States and elsewhere.21 Still, this is not yet a viable defense against the modern ICBMs Russia is currently deploying. The newer Russian missiles include sophisticated missile defense penetration aid packages that were absent in the ICBM-class target intercepted by the SM-3 Block IIA in 2020.22 Russian scholars generally agree with this assessment.23

Beyond this, radar technology remains somewhat unnoticed. Substantive progress on range and discrimination capabilities may be possible, and machine-learning technologies (and other “AI elements”) might dramatically increase the capabilities of ground-based radars, radar satellites, and probably even kill vehicle–based sensors.24

The use of directed energy weapons for “strategic” missile defense remains somewhat underdeveloped, but the threat is taken seriously on the Russian side. For example, regular scientific events are held at the Strategic Rocket Forces military academy to develop ways to protect ICBMs from lasers.25 While details are scarce, the mere fact of such regular events demonstrates how important the issue is perceived to be.

A somewhat underresearched issue is how investments in defensive technologies aimed at new threats (i.e., hypersonic weapons) can affect the “central balance” of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that assure nuclear deterrence. Technological surprises cannot be ruled out, and solutions developed to counter “hypersonic threats” might eventually undermine the penetration capabilities of the “classic” missiles and thereby effectively destabilize nuclear deterrence between the great powers. Despite this, the currently deployed hypersonic weapons of the Russian armed forces are explicitly justified by the need to overcome adversarial missile defenses.26

Russia’s Avangard missile system with hypersonic gliding winged reentry vehicle can be classified as a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) on an ICBM-type booster (SS-19 ICBM). Research and development of this system allegedly began with the Albatross project in the late 1980s after U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative.27 Albatross received a substantial push after the United States left the ABM Treaty and was vaguely mentioned by military-political leadership as early as 2004.28 Deployed in late 2019, the HGV is the first operational strategic hypersonic weapon in the world.29 To achieve survivability, the weapon is deployed in hardened silos.

Missile defense penetration due to unpredictable and relatively low flight trajectory is the main reason for the HGV program itself, although actual trajectories (including possible skip-glide maneuvers on the border of the atmosphere) have not been made public.

Another hypersonic weapon in the Russian arsenal is the Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic aeroballistic missile (a relative of the 9M723 Iskander-M surface-to-surface aeroballistic missile). With a claimed range of two thousand kilometers (likely including the range of its launcher, the MiG-31K/31I supersonic jet, originally developed as a heavy interceptor), this is not a strategic weapon per se. However, it could be used as a tool to breach surface-based missile defenses (both on land and at sea). The Kinzhal weapon system reached initial operational capability in December 2017.30 Currently, Kinzhal carriers are a part of the long-range aviation program of the Russian air-space forces, which effectively puts them in a basket separate from tactical missions.31 Kinzhal is also the only hypersonic weapon to have been used in actual military conflict, with at least one case demonstrating an air/missile defense penetration capability.32
 

Endnotes

• 16D. A. Medvedev, “,” 2011; Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “” [The factor of missile defense in the formation of a new security space], 2012; and V. I. Esin, “Amerikanskaya i rossiyskaya sistemy protivoraketnoy oborony i strategicheskaya stabil’nost’” [American and Russian missile defense systems and strategic stability], Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Ser. 25: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika [Bulletin of Moscow University, series 25: International relations and world politics] 9 (4) (2017).
• 17“” [Shoigu called the American missile defense “a leaky umbrella”], RIA Novosti, March 1, 2018. For the announcement of the systems, see Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”
• 18“” [Deputy Prime Minister Borisov called Russian weapons devaluing U.S. missile defense], Izvestiya, September 27, 2020.
• 19J. Judson, “,” Defense News, April 27, 2021.
• 20Missile Defense Project, “,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2016, last modified July 26, 2021.
• 21A. Panda, “,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 19, 2020.
• 22“,” Strategic Comments 27 (4) (2021): x–xii.
• 23“,” Yaderny kontrol [Nuclear control] (9) (527) (November 2020): 527.
• 24C. T. Lopez, “,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 21, 2021.
• 25Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “” [The XXVIII All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference has been held in the SRF Military �����Ƶ], February 17, 2020.
• 26“” [With hypersonic weapons, we have no equal in power], Krasnaya zvezda [Red star], March 1, 2018.
• 27Podvig, “Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War?”
• 28“” [History of the “Avangard” missile system creation], TASS, December 26, 2018.
• 29The first Strategic Rocket Forces regiment armed with an Avangard missile system (two launchers) was deployed in the Orenburg region no later than December 2019 as part of the 13th Missile Division, with two more launchers deployed in late 2020. The first regiment was scheduled to be rearmed with six Avangard missiles by the end of 2021. Twelve (two regiments) are planned under the 2027 State Armaments Program.
• 30Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”
• 31“” [From air-faring to air superiority], Krasnaya zvezda [Red star], August 12, 2022.
• 32“,” March 21, 2022.

Fortunately, strike systems are still absent from outer space. Some U.S. Space Force officials claim that some Russian satellites look like space torpedoes, although publicly available proof of such programs is nonexistent.33 Nonetheless, even unweaponized space is extremely important for missile defense. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, early warning systems, targeting for missile interceptors (and for long-range precision strike weapons), and data transmission all enable and enhance Earth-based missile defenses. Russian military planners are extremely concerned about such deployed technologies, especially those that offer left-of-launch capabilities. As recently as 2020, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) released diagrams and documents that explicitly mention ISR satellites that can be deployed over “provisional,” road-mobile ICBM launchers; that is, the potential targets of “Attack operations (Left of Launch).”34

One challenge associated with the proliferation of space-based ISR capabilities is the parallel development of artificial intelligence (AI)–assisted technologies of rapid data analysis. Although continuous satellite monitoring of Russian territory remains a bit too ambitious, 24/7 monitoring of crucial regions (e.g., SSBN bases and road-mobile ICBM bases and patrol areas) might be possible soon. That countermeasures are already being developed suggests that ISR and AI have already taken a seat at the “offense-defense,” action-reaction table that is the cross-domain arms race.

Russia considers such developments a major threat and is putting a lot of effort and investment into preventing them from becoming a reality. Its Peresvet battle laser is understood to be “a dazzler” capable of preventing detection and targeting of road-mobile ICBMs.35 Future counterspace capabilities include S-500 and Nudol’ surface-to-air missile systems that, although developed with the missile threat in mind, may be capable of striking targets in space.36 Moreover, because U.S. aerial early warning and control (AEW&C) and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft are considered priority targets for Russia’s long-range SA missile systems (e.g., the S-400), Russian military planners likely also consider U.S. ISR satellites to be targets of systems capable of reaching the relevant altitudes.

Another major concern for Russian officials is the global nature of U.S. missile defense, with strike platforms and sensors distributed across the planet. The launch locations and burnout speeds of interceptors are as important for successful interception as the location of detection and tracking radars. American officials and experts portray the deployment pattern of missile defense assets with little consideration for the Russian perception of this pattern, despite the geographical fact that Russia is almost entirely surrounded by these U.S. assets.37 In Russia, however, the U.S. deployment pattern has been considered a major issue for many years, and Russian officials have been vocal about it. During one international conference in 2012 that included presentations by top military brass, these concerns were explained through simulation models.38 Although the simulations are open to challenge, they are a clear example of Russian threat perception. Moreover, unilateral deployment of strategic missile defense assets in various regions of the world is considered not only to negatively affect international, regional, and national security per se but also to undermine efforts to develop multilateral mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of missiles and missile technology.39 While some of these assets are aimed at regional threats, their mission being to protect U.S. overseas deployments and U.S. allies, the demonstrated launch-on-remote and engage-on-remote capabilities of these assets are also a proof of concept that all U.S. missile defense assets belong to a joint system. A system of such sophistication is, however, vulnerable on multiple fronts and subject to numerous other problems (e.g., reliability) that can be exploited by any adversary—and the means for such exploitation are already being developed.
 

Endnotes

• 33Chelsea Gohd, “” Space.com, September 11, 2020.
• 34U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Budget Estimates Overview FY 2021.
• 35B. Hendrickx, “,” Space Review, June 15, 2020.
• 36M. Khodarenok, “‘” [“Nudol” and “Prometheus”: When the army will receive new systems], Gazeta.ru, June 19, 2020.
• 37“,” CSIS Missile Defense Project, March 2017.
• 38V. V. Gerasimov, “,” May 3, 2012.
• 39“,” Collective Security Treaty Organization, November 30, 2021.

Russian missile defense programs, although part of the challenge, can also be part of a solution. Unlike the United States, Russia has no dedicated missile defense agency. Tasks related to missile defense are carried out by the air-space forces and their air and missile defense units. The Russian concept of joint air-space defense includes air defense, missile defense, space forces (including the Sistema Konrolya Kosmicheskogo Prostranstva, SKKP, or Space Control System, for space situational awareness), early warning systems, and Moscow’s ABM system.40 Moreover, as elaborated in a 2021 article in the journal Military Thought (published by the Russian Ministry of Defense), this architecture possibly includes a space countermeasures system (Sistema protivodeystviya kosmicheskim sredstvam, SPKS), although the main priority for missile defense development is to protect both the highest command and control layers and strategic nuclear force deployment areas.41 Russia operates several major strike systems, including upgraded 53T6M interceptors for the Moscow ABM system and future S-500 and Nudol’ mobile surface-to-air missiles, with the latter, per some sources, being a capable anti-satellite (ASAT) system as well.42 An S-500 intercept test was made public in summer 2021, with launch footage (the missile interceptor is blurred in the released video) distributed by the Russian Ministry of Defense.43

One of the most interesting recent “revelations” happened during Ministry of Defense discussions of air-space defense tasks set by President Putin in November 2021.44 Defense Minister Shoigu, listing various weapons systems and emphasizing that production and deployment should be accelerated, mentioned an advanced future system: S-550.45 Subsequent reports citing various anonymous sources in the Russian military industry, as well as the head of Rostec, Sergei Chemezov, suggest that the S-550 is a mobile system with missile defense capabilities that should be able to defeat ICBM-class targets.46 A Soviet project with the same designator emerged in the late 1980s, although the two projects are barely related, with the current S-550 described as a simplified S-500 with a strict focus on missile defense.

In 2021, an open-source research article suggested that yet another program of strategic missile defense is under development in Russia, namely “Aerostat.”47 While the range of nontraditional sources used in the report (e.g., procurement documents and court cases) raises the possibility that the analyst conflated multiple programs, evidence of an ongoing R&D effort similar to the U.S. GMD is growing, although Aerostat is probably a road-mobile variant.

On a substrategic level, the S-300V family of ground force air defense systems is believed to be quite capable as a regional missile defense system, and the S-500 (part of the 77N6 missile interceptor family) might be “related” to the S-300V (part of the 9M82/9M83 missile interceptor family). The latest version of the latter system, the S-300V4, is capable of defeating tactical short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and outperforms the Patriot PAC-3 system.48 An earlier modification, the S-300V2, is deployed in the Moscow region, where it is tasked with protecting the Russian capital from “nonstrategic” ballistic missile threats.49 The capability of the S-300V system to counter nonstrategic ballistic missiles has been acknowledged by scholars from the Vasilevsky Army Air Defence Military �����Ƶ.50 Moreover, an “Abakan” missile defense system was proposed for export and first demonstrated at the Army-2020 Forum. Its appearance and announced specifications suggest it is a “mix” of the S-300V and S-500, with organic radar added to the five-axle transport erector launcher that resembles the TEL associated with the S-500.51 The 9M82 family of missile launchers was proposed as early as 2004 as the basis for the mobile layer of a missile defense system to protect “large industrial and/or administrative regions of a country.”52

Finally, in 2012, sources claimed that a next-generation “active protection” system for ICBM silo launchers was under development.53 A project with similar aims, called “Mozyr,” was under development during Soviet days, however its actual capabilities and plans are unclear.54 A major unknown is how mature is Russia’s hit-to-kill technology. The nonnuclear warhead used in Russian interceptors is described as a “high explosive with directed field of fragments” (oskolochno-fugasnaya boyevaya chast’ napravlennogo deystviya), or “high explosive with controllable fragmentation pattern,” and the designs for the 9M82, 53T6, and 77N6 may all be similar. 55 Western analysts believe that Russia’s nuclear warheads are capable of both air and missile defense; they are, however, in central storage, and their numbers are unknown.56 The destructive test of an unnamed surface-to-space system against the nonactive Kosmos-1408 satellite on November 15, 2021, raised many concerns about space security.57 However, one possibility is that this was not an ASAT test but a missile defense test to prove the maturity of Russia’s hit-to-kill technology.

Certain features of modern and next-generation early warning radars—specifically, the Voronezh and future Yakhroma series—may be included in future missile defense systems, but early warning, space control, and missile defense information is generally obtained and shared jointly.58 The Don-2N radar of the Moscow ABM system is being modernized as well, with emphasis on increased speed and precision of data analysis, and some radars of the older Dunai family are undergoing modernization.59

Russia has also begun to pay serious attention to nonballistic threats such as cruise and aeroballistic hypersonic missiles. One of its most important assets in this domain is the Konteiner family of over-the-horizon (OTH) radars, the first of which entered service in 2019–2020 in Mordovia, with more being built in western Russia (Kaliningrad), the Russian Far East (Zeya), and the Arctic.60 While this system is hardly capable of tracking separate incoming threats and providing targeting data, its main mission is to detect the operations of larger aircraft formations and, in case of conflict, missile salvo launches.61 The concept of using OTH radars for cruise missile defense has also been discussed in the United States.62

Russia is also developing substrategic missile defenses, including a regional missile defense system based on a road-mobile weapons platform to cover some cities, infrastructure, and military formations.63 Since the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, this work has become even more important, and new S-300V units have been stationed in the Russian Far East. Whether this development should raise significant concerns for the West is uncertain, however, and the new units have largely followed existing deployment patterns. Moreover, some scholars argue that deploying a nonnuclear missile defense system can contribute to strengthening security, including by removing tension in cases in which early warning systems give false signals.64

Unlike the United States, Russia deploys hardly any missile defense assets abroad, with the notable exceptions of a legacy Volga early warning radar in Belarus and an S-400 expeditionary unit in Syria. Nevertheless, Russia has a growing missile defense capability, a trend that might lead both to Russian officials better understanding the U.S. drivers of missile defense development and to U.S. officials taking a greater interest in joint limits (or at least transparency) on existing and future missile defenses. In 2013, a Russian academic argued that specifying and limiting the scope of Russian missile defense within its overall air-space defense efforts might be necessary to limit possible negative impacts on strategic stability, provide protection against real threats, and, to some extent, lay the groundwork for possible agreement and even cooperation with the United States in this domain.65
 

Endnotes

• 40“” [Aerospace defense], Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Dictionary.
• 41M. N. Kumakshev and A. V. Kravtsov, “Antimissile Defense as an Element in the Strategic Deterrence System of the Russian Federation,” Military Thought (12) (December 2021): 21–26.
• 42On the S-500, see “” [Our sky is reliably protected], Krasnaya zvezda [Red star], July 7, 2021.
• 43Ministry of Defense, “” [Test live firing of the S-500 surface-to-air system at the Kapustin Yar test range], July 20, 2021, YouTube video, 0:33.
• 44Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”
• 45Ministry of Defense, “,” November 9, 2021.
• 46“” [Sources reveal the features of the new S-550 SAM system], RIA Novosti, November 13, 2021; “” [Source: S-550 and S-500 will together protect important facilities of the Russian Federation from hypersonic threats], TASS, November 24, 2021; and “” [The range of the S-550 missiles will be increased], TASS, November 15, 2021.
• 47Bart Hendrickx, “,” October 11, 2021, Space Review.
• 48A. Luzan, “Zenitnaya raketnaya sistema S-300V4—Nadezhnyy strazh neba v XXI veke” [The S-300V4 anti-aircraft missile system is a reliable guardian of the sky in the 21st century], Vozdushno-kosmicheskaya sfera [Aerospace sphere] 2 (91) (2017): 12–21.
• 49“,” Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, September 24, 2021.
• 50S. A. Chizhov, V. V. Nemirovsky, and I. A. Lipatnikov, “Strelba ZRS S-300V po nestrategicheskim ballisticheskim raketam” [Firing S-300V SAM at nonstrategic ballistic missiles], Sovremennyye problemy proyektirovaniya, proizvodstva i ekspluatatsii radiotekhnicheskikh system [Modern Problems of Design, Production and Operation of Radio Engineering Systems] (2016): 112–113.
• 51M. Barabanov, “Zenitnyy raketnyy kompleks ‘Abakan’—Novoye predlozheniye na mirovom oboronnom rynke” [“Abakan” surface-to-air system—A new offering on the global defense market], Eksport vooruzheniy [Arms export] 160 (5) (2021): 22–24.
• 52I. Ashurbeyli, S. Gladkikh, A. Gor’kov, A. Lemanskiy, S. Ostapenko, P. Sozinov, and Y. Soloviev, “Missile Defense System, Russia,” Patent RU42302U1, filed August 18, 2004, and issued November 27, 2004.
• 53A. Mikhaylov and D. Balburov, “” [The last line of missile defense will be armed with arrows and balls], Izvestiya, December 11, 2012.
• 54“,” dfnc.ru, August 5, 2019.
• 55C. Kopp, “,” Technical Report APA-TR-2006-1202, Air Power Australia, 2003, last updated April 2012.
• 56P. Podvig, “,” October 23, 2012, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, October 23, 2012.
• 57“,” Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, November 16, 2021. A full discussion of the implictaions of missile defense technolgies for space security is beyond the scope of this paper.
• 58“” [Forewarned means protected], Krasnaya zvezda [Red star], February 15, 2021.
• 59“” [The sky of the capital is under vigilant control], Krasnaya zvezda [Red star], July 21, 2021.
• 60“,” TASS, December 2, 2019.
• 61“Nebo stolitsy pod neusypnym kontrolem” [The sky of the capital is under vigilant control].
• 62T. Karako, I. Williams, W. Rumbaugh, K. Harmon, and M. Strohmeyer, , CSIS Missile Defense Project (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2022).
• 63R. Kretsul and A. Ramm, “” [“Intercept” plan: Cities to get missile defense], Izvestia, October 3, 2018.
• 64A. Savel’ev, “” [Ballistic missile early warning system and strategic stability], Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya [World economy and international relations] 60 (12) (2016): 40–50.
• 65A. Arbatov, “” [Missile defense philosophy], Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye [Independent military review], May 31, 2013.

One result of the unique strategic partnership between Russia and China is growing cooperation, including in some sensitive areas. In July 2000, a joint statement on missile defense was signed by President Putin and Chairman Jiang Zemin calling for preservation of the ABM Treaty and addressing the challenges of nonstrategic missile defense undermining security and stability.66 Since then, mutual understanding of the threats in this domain has grown. The 2021 joint statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation includes a paragraph related to missile defense, with direct blame assigned to the United States for undermining “international and regional security and global strategic stability” with its development and global deployment of missile defense capabilities (and concomitant efforts to increase the capabilities of its long-range nonnuclear weapons).67 Similar points were reiterated in a joint Russian-Chinese statement issued in early 2022 expressing “concern over the advancement of U.S. plans to develop global missile defense and deploy its elements in various regions of the world, combined with capacity building of high-precision non-nuclear weapons for disarming strikes and other strategic objectives.”68

Russia has exported air and missile defense systems (S-300PMU, S-400), as well as radars (including OTH and space tracking), directly to China.69 Since 2019, it has been public knowledge that Russia provided support to the development of Chinese early warning capabilities.70 That support may have been limited (at least thus far) to the layout of the Chinese system. Nevertheless, early warning is inherently related to missile defense.

As for missile defense systems per se, Russian and Chinese service personnel have completed several “computer” exercises in this area.71 Such exercises include joint planning of operations to organize air and missile defenses, command and control, joint firing, and the response to accidental and provocative attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles against Russian and Chinese territory. Related to this is the extended Agreement on Notification of Launches of Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Vehicles between Russia and China.72 While the primary intent of the agreement is bilateral confidence building and transparency, Russia has explicitly contextualized its importance by citing U.S. efforts to deploy global missile defense capabilities.73 This—along with growing military competition between China and the United States and the lack of deescalation between Russia and the West—suggests that further developments in the same direction can be expected.

While details of the impact that the development of Chinese missile defense capabilities (including those with Russian support) might have on strategic stability are rarely discussed, such developments are cited among the reasons necessitating the future multilateralization of “strategic” arms control and the broadening of its scope toward missile defense and nonnuclear long-range precision weapons.74 The overall scope of Chinese air and missile defense development is being researched by Russian experts as well.75 Missile defense, with a focus on countering ICBM-class threats, is considered to be a priority for Chinese development efforts by some Russian authors.76 However, the explicit link between growing Chinese missile defense capabilities and Russian national security and foreign policy interests remains underresearched in the West. Conversely, the role of U.S. regional missile defense as a deterrence tool against both Russia and China and debates around this issue are being studied by Russian scholars, although without final judgments so far.77
 

Endnotes

• 66“” [Joint statement of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Chairman of the People’s Republic of China Jiang Zemin on missile defense], July 19, 2000.
• 67“,” June 28, 2021.
• 68“,” February 4, 2022.
• 69On the radar exports, see A. Gabuyev and V. Kashin, [Armed friendship: How Russia and China trade in arms] (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, November 2017); and “Nauchnaya shkola: Razrabotka i sozdaniye sredstv nadgorizontnoy radiolokatsii v interesakh SPRN, SKKP I PRO” [Scientific school: Development and creation of means of over-the-horizon radar in the interests of EWS, SKKP and PRO], Uspekhi sovremennoy radioelektroniki [Advances in modern radio electronics] (9) (2016): 6–8.
• 70D. Stefanovich, “,” The Diplomat, October 25, 2019.
• 71“” [China and Russia missile defense command post exercises to be held in Russia in 2019], TASS, April 25, 2019.
• 72“” [Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on notification of launches of ballistic missile and space launch vehicles].
• 73“” [Russian Defense Minister: Sergei Shoigu met via video link with Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe], December 15, 2020.
• 74S. V. Golubchikov, “” [Development of the strategic component of the Chinese naval and missile defense system], Morskoy sbornik [Sea collection] 9 (2022) (2015): 61–68.
• 75S. V. Golubchikov, G. B. Gurov, M. V. Zhesthev, V. I. Kolesnichenko, and V. K. Novikov, “” [Development of air and missile defense in China], Vestnik vozdushno-kosmicheskoy oborony [Journal of aerospace defense] 4 (2017): 117–123.
• 76P. Andreyev, “” [State and development prospects of China’s air defense system], Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye [Foreign military review] (7) (2020): 52–58.
• 77O. O. Krivolapov, “” [Debates on the role of U.S. theater missile defense in regional deterrence of Russia and China], Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Ser. 25: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika [Bulletin of Moscow University, ser. 25: International relations and world politics] 13 (1) (2021): 58–84.

Where do we go from here, and what should we do next? To help answer these questions, the overall issue can be separated into several building blocks.

First, a frank Track I discussion is required. Currently, negotiations are at a deadlock, with Russian officials saying that missile defense must be part of the future security equation and most U.S. officials saying that it is off the table.78 This leads us nowhere, and, worst of all, it does not give officials on either side any incentive to engage in a joint search for solutions. To overcome this challenge, language that creates a new opening might prove useful. For example, shifting from a focus on “missile defense” as a broad issue, as it is currently discussed, to “undermining of second strike capability” might help the two sides define the actual problems and issues. If Russia and the United States could achieve mutual understanding of which technical capabilities are of concern to which nation, they could then agree to greater transparency in future development plans, although setting actual hard limits is unlikely. The Russia-U.S. consultations within the scope of the Strategic Stability Dialogue launched after the summer 2020 presidential summit in Geneva gave a glimmer of hope. Although we have no insights into how missile defense was discussed, the topic clearly was on the agenda.79 Moscow might be as willing “to give” as “to take,” and, as history shows (most notably in the so-called Krasnoyarsk radar case, which was dismantled because the United States argued it violated the ABM Treaty provision on nondeployment of large phased-array radars deep inside one’s territory), Moscow might be ready to address Washington’s concerns.80 Some Russian analysts suggest shifting attention from the relatively toxic topic of the U.S. GMD—unrestrained development of which enjoys broad support in the United States—to out-of-national-territory mobile missile defense platforms.81 Others argue for an option to delink missile defense from the “START process” and begin with an additional transparency level focused on relevant research and development efforts.82

Second, the United States could unilaterally, outside its bilateral discussions with Russia, use more technical and less bellicose language in its next missile defense review. This relatively simple change would be beneficial to all. On the Russian side, one can only hope that something like a Basic Principles of State Policy on Air Space Defense will be prepared and released. No one expected Russia to publicize its Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence in 2020,83 so greater symmetry in available declaratory missile/air/space defense policy documents could become a reality. Having “symmetrical” documents prepared and published by other countries, including China, would be helpful as well. Of course, declaratory policies might be considered less important than actual military capabilities and deployments. However, such policies can and should be used to assess and better understand how one’s partner (or adversary) thinks about such issues, even if their actions somewhat contradict their documents.

Third, academics and other experts need to hold regular and highly specific exchanges on the technical capabilities of missile defense assets, planned developments, and mutual concerns, as well as the drivers behind ongoing trends.

Finally, the role of space in missile defense deserves its own discussion. While the deployment of a space intercept layer is a major destabilizing possibility, even existing space-based ISR capabilities are a major concern, especially if they enhance “left-of-launch” capabilities. The link between ASAT and ABM capabilities, which are next to impossible to distinguish, only heightens such concerns.

One crucial opportunity that might pave the way toward a new era of arms control is Russia’s seeming openness to “non-legally binding”—that is, “politically binding”—agreements as a “second-best scenario.”84 Missile defense remains a challenge for international and national security alike. It presents technical hurdles, drives the arms race, and is an irritant to the smooth operation of diplomacy. However, the original 1972 ABM Treaty was not an easy thing to achieve, and on the road to its creation Moscow and Washington had to overcome serious conceptual differences. We might not see a similar document anytime soon, or at all, but addressing misperceptions and misunderstandings is a task of paramount importance.

Endnotes

• 78“,” December 7, 2020; and Kingston Reif and Shannon Bugos, “,” Arms Control Today, September 2021.
• 79“,” TASS, November 2, 2021.
• 80On the Krasnoyarsk radar case, see Pavel Podvig and Amy F. Woolf, (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2019).
• 81A. A. Baklitskiy, “,” Journal of International Analytics 11 (4) (2020): 39–55.
• 82K. V. Bogdanov, “,” Russia in Global Affairs 19 (3) (2021): 116–13636.
• 83.
• 84E. Chernenko, “‘” [“We do not play political games around strategic stability”: Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov on upcoming consultations with the United States], Kommersant, September 9, 2021.