Strategy 4: Deploy Diverse Options for Controlling Emissions
Decarbonization is essential but disruptive. There are many options, but no silver bullets. Strategic mitigation must therefore balance diversification and experimentation with the power of market forces to direct investments toward the most promising options.
This report is agnostic about the appropriate technologies for emissions reduction. Some options for decarbonization raise questions about safety (nuclear power), others around resource use (land use for mass deployment of solar and wind). Some options remain cost-prohibitive without subsidies (clean hydrogen or carbon capture and storage), while others remain untested or undeveloped (many of the technologies needed for controlling methane and nitrous oxide). All options involve real concerns and tradeoffs, and viable solutions will vary by region and time. In practice, the best option will likely be a combination of well-developed strategies, such as improved building efficiency standards, and more long-range technologies, such as advanced nuclear, clean hydrogen, or electricity from natural gas with carbon capture and storage.101 It is clear, however, that the costs of delay, measured in avoidable climate impacts, greatly exceed the costs of accelerated action to reduce emissions.102
Emphasis on emissions-reduction strategies that are equitable, affordable, reliable, and tuned to local conditions can ensure rapid progress. Engagement and compromise can be the foundation for building mitigation strategies that are both just and pragmatic. Keeping all reasonable options available will lower the cost of action and enhance feasibility. The best overall strategies for cutting emissions will likely involve a blend of approaches. Those include economy-wide signals that incentives for cutting emissions will strengthen over time. These strategies must incorporate mitigation technologies that are popular and politically feasible as well as those that are more challenging. They also include investment in innovation to expand the range of viable technologies and business practices, reducing the overall cost of action.
Midwest Alliance for Clean Hydrogen: Public-Private Partnerships to Establish Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs
The Department of Energy’s Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations announced the H2Hubs Program in 2022, which aims to direct funding from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law toward building regional hydrogen hubs to promote the production of clean hydrogen and work toward net-zero carbon emissions goals. The Midwest Alliance for Clean Hydrogen, composed of partners across the public and private sectors, is one group that hopes to take advantage of this funding, to initiate hydrogen projects across Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, and Wisconsin.103
The alliance comprises seventy members from these states, including universities, nonprofits, national laboratories, energy transmission and distribution companies, and independent research institutes. Legislators and governors have voiced bipartisan support of the alliance.
Implementation of the proposed projects will benefit communities, with an emphasis on supporting historically disadvantaged communities. Clean hydrogen projects will bolster local economies by increasing energy independence and creating job opportunities. Alliance members, including academic institutions, plan to provide workforce training opportunities for community members.
Endnotes
4.1 Implement a fair carbon price in conjunction with other policies to create strong demand for low-emission technologies.
Every ton of CO2 emitted into the atmosphere causes damage for which no one is currently held responsible. Because of shifting political environments, the Commission has not developed a consensus view on the right price for emissions, but offers $100 per ton of CO2 emitted as a price that may be politically feasible and sends a clear signal about the need to act.104
The country should aspire to align the price set on carbon emissions with the full costs that carbon pollution puts on the economy and society. Those costs, known as the social cost of carbon, include the vast health care costs, estimated at $820 billion annually, from pollutants created when fossil fuels are burned.105 Estimates of the social cost of carbon vary widely due to different approaches to weighing current costs against future harms and benefits. However, the trend in the research is clear: estimates of the social cost of carbon are rising sharply.
Achieving a carbon price in the United States has been politically challenging, as demonstrated by the failure of the 2009 Waxman-Markey Bill to initiate a cap-and-trade system. Many of the concerns surrounding the Waxman-Markey Bill are still highly relevant to current pricing efforts, including those related to fairness, international relationships, target-setting, and revenue spending. But despite this historical context, there are several reasons to encourage continued efforts. Thirteen U.S. states have already implemented emissions trading schemes. Both taxes and trading schemes are also used internationally, especially in Europe, where an emission pricing system covers between one-third and one-half of all EU emissions.106
Carbon pricing is a powerful tool to motivate decarbonization, but it will not be sufficient on its own. Particular attention is needed to address the potential disproportionate economic impact on lower-income American neighborhoods, such as through the many proposals that have focused on refunding some or all of the revenues directly to the public.107 This “fee and dividend” approach could be used to offset other taxes in ways that could improve the nation’s public finances and shift the taxation burden. This model has broad support, though no concrete proposal exists.108 Through interviews, the Commission found that these ideas also commanded significant support from businesses.109 Such an approach has the advantage of making the level of effort to cut emissions highly transparent, which could assist with the imposition of corrective tariffs on goods traded in international markets.
Endnotes
- 104Rebecca Hersher and Lesley Clark, “,” NPR, February 4, 2023.
- 105Donald De Alwis and Vijay S. Limaye, (New York: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2021).
- 106European Environment Agency, “,” January 12, 2022.
- 107Laurent Belsie, “” National Bureau of Economic Research, January 1, 2010; and James Baker III, Martin Feldstein, Ted Halstead, et al., “v” (Washington, D.C.: Climate Leadership Council, 2017), 1–2.
- 108Alec Tyson and Brian Kennedy, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2020).
- 109Nick Sobczyk, “,” Scientific American, April 14, 2021; American ÇďżűĘÓƵ of Arts and Sciences, Barriers to Private Sector Action; and Anthony Leiserowitz, Edward Maibach, Seth Rosenthal, and John Kotcher, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, 2021).
4.2 Cooperate with international allies to realign trade rules in favor of emissions reductions and make supply chains more resilient.
Many emission-intensive products such as steel, automobiles, and agricultural products are traded globally. Approximately one-quarter of global emissions of CO2 and one-half of global emissions of methane result from the production of internationally traded goods.110 Decarbonization will require developing low- or no-emission alternatives to producing these goods, but it will also depend on creating low-emission global supply chains.
With the proper rules, U.S. exporters can use clean technologies to gain strategic advantages in the global market. However, if the United States adopts strong emissions-control policies, exporters in countries with more relaxed regulations gain a competitive advantage, hurting U.S. industry and employment. Such investment losses occurred in Europe as its Emissions Trading Scheme grew stricter.111 Disengaging from the global economy is not a viable answer because low-emission industrial economies depend on global supply chains to access low-carbon technologies. These supply chains reflect both potential employment opportunities and economic vulnerability to monopolies.
Develop standard and accurate metrics for assessing the carbon footprints of industrial activities and phase in a carbon-border-adjustment system.
One of the most significant barriers to strengthened cross-border cooperation is inconsistency in the carbon pricing of traded goods and services. Accurate estimates of a product’s carbon footprint are complex, particularly as the environmental cost may vary significantly based on the production technique.112 Currently, many U.S. industries have unique and opaque systems to determine carbon footprints that do not necessarily incorporate the environmental cost of raw materials, making comparisons difficult. However, developing goods that meet multiple standards can also be prohibitive for small producers.
Combatting carbon leakage, whereby the unilateral imposition of a carbon price in one area encourages production in less regulated areas, also requires international cooperation. Instead of a global carbon price, carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) can reinforce individual carbon prices while decreasing overall emissions. Congress has drafted but not yet implemented legislation on this subject.113 Along with strong national emission control policies, the nation should adopt a border tariff mechanism. Congress should design that system to align with the World Trade Organization (WTO) standards, which allow for border adjustments applied for legitimate environmental purposes.
Agricultural Technology to Reduce Methane Emissions
Livestock farming is integral to many communities, providing food security and playing an important role in many cultures. However, livestock-produced methane emissions account for about 27 percent of anthropogenic methane emissions.114 Ruminants, including cattle and sheep, are responsible for most of these emissions due to the structure of their digestive systems and the scale at which they are raised.
Employing strategies such as increasing feed intake, grazing on less mature grass, and adding methane inhibitors to feed have all been proposed to mitigate methane emissions. Increased quantitative research on these methods is needed to evaluate negative environmental or livestock health effects, but the data so far suggest that these strategies could significantly reduce livestock-produced emissions levels.115 While employing combinations of these strategies will likely result in greater emissions reductions, it is possible that the use of certain strategies in tandem will decrease their efficacy. Further investigation into how these strategies interact with each other is needed to determine the compatibility of strategies. Additionally, the cost-effectiveness of these strategies needs to be evaluated to ensure that all farmers, regardless of income level, have access to more climate-friendly livestock practices and technology. Where financial barriers exist, additional support or incentives may be necessary.
Strengthen U.S.-EU trade relations by identifying equivalent national policy mechanisms that foster open trading.
As the United States debates adopting a border measure, Europe has already enacted most of the elements of such a measure. In December 2022, the European Union passed regulations to introduce CBAMs in several sectors starting in October 2023.116 Whether and how EU measures will recognize U.S. efforts to control emissions remains unclear because the European CBAM regime is designed around the European emission control strategy (which hinges on an EU-wide cap-and-trade system). At the same time, the U.S. policy is a more eclectic mix of subsidies and regulations and a few market-based mechanisms. Domestic subsidies created by the Inflation Reduction Act, including incentives for onshore production, have created tensions with Europe. The U.S. government should take the lead in outlining a productive trade relationship. Solutions should balance promoting open trading with key allies without hurting domestic production of green technology.
Endnotes
- 110Ankai Xu, Enxhi Tresa, Marc Bacchetta, et al., “,” Information Brief No. 4 (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2021); and Chaopeng Hong, Hongyan Zhao, Yue Qin, et al., “,” Science 376 (6593) (2022): 597–603.
- 111Filip De Beule, Frederiek Schoubben, and Kristof Struyfs, “,” Economics Letters 215 (2022).
- 112Subramanian Senthilkannan Muthu, ed., Assessment of Carbon Footprint in Different Industrial Sectors, Volume 1 (Berlin: Springer Nature, 2014).
- 113Chris Coons, “,” 117th Congress, 1st session, 2021.
- 114U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “,” in Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2019 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2021).
- 115Claudia Arndt, Alexander N. Hristov, and William J. Price, “,” Proceedings of the National ÇďżűĘÓƵ of Sciences 119 (20) (2022): e2111294119.
- 116Jonathan L. Ramseur, Brandon J. Murrill, and Christopher A. Casey, “,” R47167 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2023).
4.3 Advance efforts to control non-CO2 greenhouse gases and climate warming aerosols, especially pollutants that have large impacts on human health and the environment.
Non-CO2 greenhouse gases, including methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases (such as hydrofluorocarbons), account for almost 20 percent of all greenhouse emissions in the United States.117 The primary sources include livestock, oil and gas drilling, coal mining, soil management, and refrigeration. Most non-CO2 greenhouse gases trap more heat per molecule than CO2 in the atmosphere, although they have shorter atmospheric lifetimes. In addition to non-CO2 gases, particulate pollution (soot) causes significant amounts of climate warming while also causing severe health impacts—particulate pollution is the leading environmental cause of premature death.118 Particulate pollution from fossil fuels is predominantly located in impoverished areas with high proportions of racial and ethnic minorities in the United States, exacerbating environmental inequality.119
Strengthen and enforce existing regulations and incentives for non-CO2 gases.
Regulation of these non-CO2 gas emissions offers a tremendous opportunity to provide tangible benefits to the climate while also advancing other goals such as protecting public health. The EPA has written some regulations on emissions of non-CO2 gases, such as methane via the New Source Performance Standards, which regulate the oil and gas industry, and nitrogen oxide emissions from heavy-duty diesel vehicles.120 Recent legislation also includes a new tax on methane emissions, although implementation of that tax has yet to be worked out. Some states, including California, have independently implemented additional regulations, such as controlling refrigerants and including methane and fluorinated gases in their cap-and-trade program.121 Since 2019, Wyoming has enacted policies that require oil and gas companies to capture or reduce methane emissions and regularly inspect equipment with the goal of reducing methane emissions by 45 percent by 2025.122
Focus funding to communities suffering from high pollution by particulates.
Particulate pollution, such as from large agricultural operations, power plants, and diesel trucks, is often concentrated in frontline communities. Many of the health risks can be reduced with investments in closing coal electricity plants and getting diesel trucks off the road, and targeted investments from federal agencies and states in frontline communities will be necessary to both control these pollutants and minimize the health risks.123 Additional investments should also target improved monitoring and data sharing, which will allow more strategic pollution control.
Endnotes
- 117U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “,” March 2022.
- 118Massimo Franchini and Pier Mannuccio Mannucci, “Impact on Human Health of Climate Changes,” European Journal of Internal Medicine 26 (1) (2015): 1–5.
- 119Nicole Kravitz-Wirtz, Samantha Teixeira, Anjum Hajat, et al., “Early-Life Air Pollution Exposure, Neighborhood Poverty, and Childhood Asthma in the United States, 1990–2014,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 15 (6) (2018): 1114.
- 120U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “,” Federal Register 81 (107) (2016): 35824.
- 121California Air Resources Board, “,” August 13, 2018.
- 122Joyce Stephanie, ”,” Wyoming Public Radio, January 14, 2015.
- 123Jason Hill, Stephen Polasky, Erik Nelson, et al., “Climate Change and Health Costs of Air Emissions from Biofuels and Gasoline,” Proceedings of the National ÇďżűĘÓƵ of Sciences 106 (6) (2009): 2077–2082.
4.4 Incentivize farmers and other landowners to decrease greenhouse gas emissions and increase carbon sequestration.
Agriculture is responsible for approximately 25 percent of climate-warming pollution through livestock emissions, forest clearing and land degradation, overfertilization, and fossil fuel use in agricultural production.124 Achieving mitigation targets will require changes throughout the agricultural sector. The best options for solutions will vary by location, climate, crop or commodity, site history, and available management technologies. Those that can increase resilience and can support continued progress on yields are likely to have bipartisan support and show the greatest political feasibility.125
Support federal programs that offer training and education in technologies for emissions reduction and carbon sequestration.
Governments and the private sector should provide the technical and financial assistance required to ensure widespread access to emissions-reduction and carbon-sequestration knowledge and tools by all agricultural producers, regardless of income or geography. For example, the omnibus Farm Bill could include expansions of programs such as the Conservation Innovation Grants, which provide funding to develop and demonstrate cutting-edge conservation and emissions-reduction technologies.126 Similarly, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program provides technical assistance to farmers and ranchers to implement conservation practices on their lands.127 The focus on market-based solutions and the support for rural communities make both of these programs popular across the political spectrum.
Increase funding for programs focused on researching and implementing emissions reductions and carbon sequestration.
Climate change is also directly impacting farmers, reducing agricultural productivity and worsening droughts. Given the substantial financial risk for farmers in adopting innovative technology, farmers need the expansion of programs such as the Conservation Stewardship Program that incentivize emissions reductions, soil carbon sequestration, or improved conservation on their land.128 These expansions should emphasize support for small farms and farms located in communities on the front line of climate change, which have historically been less able to access stewardship funding. As more research is needed to measure soil health and quantify carbon sequestration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) should partner with land-grant universities to develop reliable measuring tools.
Endnotes
- 124U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “,” last updated April 28, 2023.
- 125Maria Kalaitzandonakes, Brenna Ellison, and Jonathan Coppess, “” farmdoc daily 13 (44) (2023).
- 126U.S. Department of Agriculture, “,” (accessed June 12, 2023).
- 127Natural Resources Conservation Service, “” (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Conservation Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2019).
- 128Natural Resources Conservation Service, “” (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Conservation Service, United States Department of Agriculture, 2021).
4.5 Support effective nature-based climate solutions.
Nature-based climate solutions, those using natural processes, systems, and biodiversity to address environmental and societal challenges, can be important tools for reducing emissions and increasing sequestration while protecting biodiversity and improving overall community resilience.129 Examples of nature-based climate solutions include the protection and restoration of wetlands, grasslands, and forests, as well as the expansion of carbon-sequestering ecosystems, where appropriate. Nature-based climate solutions have the potential to contribute to emissions reduction and also build resilience in local communities. However, many nature-based climate solutions created for carbon offset calculation are of low quality.130 To combat this, the government should take enforcement action against offset systems that make false or misleading claims about their effectiveness.
Nature-based climate solutions are most attractive when they combine affordable costs with cobenefits such as conservation of biodiversity, water quality improvements, disaster risk reduction, and job creation in local economies. Nature-based climate solutions have been effectively applied in some of the most vulnerable areas in the United States, particularly along the Gulf Coast. The Louisiana Coastal Master Plan includes $1.7 billion for investments in coastal restoration and wetland revitalization.131 The Alabama Coastal Foundation has worked to restore oyster reefs, which protect against storm surge and erosion, while also improving water quality and growing the local economy.132
In addition to providing investments in local communities, these efforts have increased well-being in some of the most vulnerable areas through green sector jobs, greater access to green space, and the preservation of cultural heritage. These cobenefits make nature-based climate solutions popular across the political spectrum: they can appear market-friendly and can appeal to a wide set of values and priorities, such as increasing rural land management and development, conserving nature for fishing and hunting, and promoting environmental justice.133
Expand the integration of nature-based climate solutions in climate policy.
Climate policy at the federal, state, and local levels should recognize nature-based climate solutions as key parts of the response portfolio for mitigating climate change. This can include setting targets for carbon sequestration and promoting the use of nature-based climate solutions in emissions-reduction plans. For example, the federal government’s Climate Action Plan includes a goal to conserve at least 30 percent of U.S. lands and waters by 2030, an investment in reforestation and restoration of wetlands and other ecosystems, and funding for coastal resilience projects.134
Amending existing regulations to better incorporate nature-based climate solutions will increase available funding streams. Many existing laws and regulations may not explicitly allow for or support the use of nature-based climate solutions, creating legal and regulatory barriers to implementation. Updating laws to better support nature-based climate solutions could help reduce these barriers and facilitate their adoption. For example, amending the Coastal Zone Management Act to require consideration of nature-based solutions, such as living shorelines, as part of coastal zone management planning and decision-making processes would allow frontline communities access to more resilient solutions.
Promote Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge and leadership.
Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge provides valuable insights into climate mitigation options through nature-based climate solutions. For example, many Indigenous communities in the United States have used prescribed fire for thousands of years. Prescribed fire can contribute to climate mitigation by reducing available fuel and promoting the growth of fire-resistant vegetation, which sequesters carbon. The Karuk Tribe in California helps incorporate their traditional ecological knowledge into contemporary fire management practices to promote ecosystem health and resilience while also mitigating climate change.135 Indigenous-led conservation projects in the United States also protect important biodiversity and carbon storage areas while supporting Indigenous livelihoods and cultural values. For example, the Yurok Tribe in California has established the Yurok Carbon Project, which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and sequester carbon by sustainably managing their forests.136
Endnotes
- 129Justine Delangue, Pauline Teillac-Deschamps, and SĂ©bastien Moncorps, (Montreuil, France: IUCN French Committee, 2019).
- 130Nathalie Seddon, Alexandre Chausson, Pam Berry, et al., “Understanding the Value and Limits of Nature-Based Solutions to Climate Change and other Global Challenges,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 375 (1794) (2020): 20190120.
- 131Natalie Peyronnin, Mandy Green, Carol Parsons Richards, et al., “Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal Master Plan: Overview of a Science-Based and Publicly Informed Decision-Making Process,” Journal of Coastal Research 67 (10067) (2013): 1–15.
- 132Quan T. Lai, Elise R. Irwin, and Yaoqi Zhang, “,” Ocean and Coastal Management 187 (2020): 105104.
- 133Amber Todoroff, “,” Environmental and Energy Study Institute, July 2, 2020.
- 134National Climate Task Force, The White House, “,” May 8, 2023, (accessed June 12, 2023).
- 135Aja Conrad, Miakah Nix, and Kathy Lynn (Pacific Northwest Tribal Climate Change Project/University of Oregon Environmental Studies Program), “,” U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, July 22, 2020.
- 136Beth Rose Middleton Manning and Kaitlin Reed, “Returning the Yurok Forest to the Yurok Tribe: California’s First Tribal Carbon Credit Project,” Stanford Environmental Law Journal 39 (2019): 71.